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Executive Summary 
 The Work Capability Assessment (WCA) – which assesses eligibility for the main out-of-work 
disability benefit, Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) – is a crucial part of the British benefits 
system, yet it is widely seen to be failing.  Part of the problem is how the outsourced assessments 
have been delivered on the ground, but even after Atos are replaced by Maximus this year, the root 
problems of the WCA will remain.  Despite its name, the Work Capability Assessment simply does 
not assess claimants’ capability for work.  It assigns points to functional impairments, but never 
considers whether there are any actual jobs that a claimant could do.  Nor does it directly consider 
whether a person can undertake work-related activity, or the employment support that a person 
might need. It is a standardised test, but one that consistently measures the wrong thing. 
Incapacity, we argue, means that someone’s functional impairments interfere with their ability to 
get or keep a job, given who they are.  In the real world, different people are more or less able to 
find or keep work despite their impairments; just because Stephen Hawking is working does not 
mean that other people with the same impairments should be considered fit-for-work.  In practice, 
qualifications affect the types of jobs you can do, as do skills, work experience and age, and even the 
sorts of jobs that are available in the local labour market.  Both charities and disabled people have 
been calling for some form of this assessment, which they have termed a ‘real-world assessment’.  
However, the Minister for Employment raised concerns about the fairness of real-world tests, while 
the official reviewer of the WCA felt that there was little evidence on what such a test might look like 
in practice. 
This report meets this challenge by looking at how other countries assess incapacity, based on a 
review of the English-language literature.  It examines three countries that we knew use some form 
of real-world assessment (Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands), and four Anglo-Saxon countries 
that are most similar to the UK (USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand).  Based on these seven 
countries, we find five lessons for the UK.  
Lesson #1: Real-world assessment is possible – and even commonplace. 
In different ways, all of the countries in this review – even the Anglo-Saxon countries – have a form 
of ‘real-world assessment’.  As the Canadian system states, age, education and work experience 
‘directly affect a person’s ability to work’, and therefore need to considered when assessing 
eligibility for benefit.  It is simply not the case that real-world assessments are utopian and 
unworkable; instead, it is the WCA that appears strange in an international perspective.  
Lesson #2: A standardised real-world assessment is possible 
One approach to real-world assessment is to introduce a discretionary system, but it is difficult to 
ensure consistency in any such system.  However, the review shows that it is possible to marry 
standardisation with an accurate, real-world assessment.  The Netherlands and the USA both use 
databases of information on the various requirements of different occupations (both functional and 
educational), which are matched against the specific capacities and skills of the claimant to produce 
a list of occupations that the claimant can realistically do.  Potentially claimants could therefore get a 
clear message about why they are being found fit-for-work, and this could provide information 
needed to design effective return-to-work strategies.   
Lesson #3: We can separate real-world incapacity from unemployment 
One of the challenges of real-world incapacity assessment is separating incapacity from 
unemployment, because in the real world incapacity is intrinsically linked to employability.  In the 
face of this problem, there are two ways in which most other countries have nevertheless 
maintained a dividing line between unemployment and incapacity. Firstly, many countries have 
emphasised that functional impairments still need to be caused by medical conditions.  Secondly, it 
is common to explicitly specify that local labour demand is not taken into account.  These systems 
consider real-world factors in the sense that they look at which jobs a person could realistically do, 
given their personal characteristics – but not whether are vacancies for these jobs at the present 
time.  This addresses one of the key concerns about the fairness of a real-world assessment. 
Lesson #4: Unemployment benefits must also be a ‘safe place’ for disabled people 
Put simply, some genuinely disabled people will not be claiming incapacity benefits in almost any 
system.  As many as 11.5 million working-age people have a long-term condition, and many of these 
people will face genuine disadvantages in the labour market, even if their disabilities are not 
sufficient for them to be classified as entitled to incapacity benefits.  Beyond ESA, the rest of the 
benefits system must still be a ‘safe place’ for other disabled people in the support that is given and 
(if this exists) in the conditionality that is applied.  JSA is not yet a safe place for disabled people, and 
this makes the WCA a higher-stakes and more traumatic assessment than it needs to be. 
Lesson #5: It is hard to evaluate the success of incapacity assessments from other countries 
We have talked about ‘the lessons from other countries’ – but we should stress that this is based on 
what other countries show to be possible, rather than proving empirically that their assessments are 
successful.  This is not because ‘success’ can be ignored, but because it is almost impossible to know 
how successful other countries’ incapacity assessments are.  It is also clear no country feels it has 
cracked the problem of high incapacity rates in the twenty-first century.  Even if no other countries 
are currently subject to the outcry over the WCA, most countries have a restless discontentment 
with many aspects of their incapacity system. 
These five lessons offer us a starting point for rethinking the WCA – yet further work is needed to 
turn these into a blueprint for implementation.  We therefore recommend that the new 
Government in May 2015 take the following steps towards a new incapacity assessment: 
 Commit to replacing the WCA with a real-world incapacity assessment.  
 Create a wide-ranging expert panel to develop the new incapacity test.   
 Undertake study visits to key countries, particularly the USA and the Netherlands.   
 Look at how the public and other key groups respond to any proposals.   
 Estimate the costs of a new assessment system – but also the savings that it could generate.   
 Involve disabled people from the outset.   
The next three years of the Rethinking Incapacity project will contribute to some of these steps, but 
academic research can only do so much in the absence of a wider appetite for change. There is wide 
agreement that we have pushed the WCA as far as we can in terms of minor tweaks and 
adjustments and changes of provider, and a major reform is now needed to restore the system to 
effectiveness and legitimacy.  Our view is that this reform should be based on a real-world idea of 
incapacity – not for political reasons, but simply because this is what incapacity is, what most people 
understand it to be, and what disabled people need to deal with in the real world.  This pamphlet 
shows that real-world incapacity is a realistic path, and we hope that the sorely-needed review to 
overhaul the WCA will similarly begin in the real world of incapacity, rather than in the false dream 
of the WCA. 
The ‘Rethinking Incapacity’ project 
This report is part of a wider three-year research project looking at how non-medical factors are 
tangled up in the real-world of incapacity.  The project includes four strands of work: 
1. International comparisons, of how incapacity assessment works in other countries; 
2. Perceived legitimacy: a new survey and series of deliberative workshops to look at what 
people think a fair test looks like; 
3. Better data, so that we get figures we can trust about the employment rate of disabled 
people across time and place; 
4. Unequal incapacity: new research into how non-medical factors in incapacity actually work 
in practice. 
The project is led by Ben Baumberg and funded by the ESRC, with some strands also involving 
collaborations with the think-tank Demos and a team at the University of Durham led by Prof Clare 
Bambra – all of whom have been involved in this report.  For more information then please see 
http://www.demos.co.uk/projects/rethinkingincapacity and 
http://www.benbaumberg.com/disability.htm, and if you are interested in discussing this then 
please do not hesitate to get in touch with Ben via www.benbaumberg.com.  
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1. Introduction 
The Work Capability Assessment (WCA) – which assesses eligibility for the main out-of-work 
disability benefit, Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) – is a crucial part of the British benefits 
system, yet it is widely seen to be failing.  Indeed, it has now been failing for some time.  As part of a 
wider (and continuing) process of reform, the WCA was introduced in 2008 and rolled-out to all 
claimants from 2010, such that three-quarters of a million assessments took place in 2013.1  But 
despite existing on such a scale, the DWP’s own annual independent reviewers have said that crucial 
changes are needed to the WCA – and they have said this every year for the past five years (see 
below).  Indeed, academics have found that some disabled people live in outright fear of the DWP’s 
‘brown envelope’ calling them to an assessment, with many claimants saying that the process 
damages their health, and even anecdotal reports that the stress of the assessment process has 
contributed to suicides among claimants.2  As a result, it appears that every few months the WCA is 
condemned by yet another body, whether this be major charities, doctors or disabled people 
themselves.3 
Part of the problem has been how the assessments have been delivered on the ground, with 
considerable delays in being seen, inaccessible centres preventing people from being assessed, and 
once the assessments actually take place, too many poor-quality assessments (a substantial minority 
of which are overturned on appeal; see below).  The WCA was initially outsourced to the 
multinational company Atos, who had been providing previous incapacity tests since 1998.  
However, Atos were subject to an increasing barrage of criticism, and in March 2014 the DWP 
announced that Atos had agreed to terminate the contract early – and indeed, had paid the 
Government to do so, given the bad publicity and death threats to their staff involved (see also 
Warren et al., 2014).  Atos are in the process of being replaced by the US-based company Maximus, 
though some disability activists have raised concerns about fraud and poor performance in 
Maximus’ provision of (different) outsourced public services in the US.4 
But even if Maximus are an improvement on Atos, it is widely recognised that the root problems of 
the WCA will remain.  As the Work and Pensions Select Committee recently put it (2014),  
 “The flaws in the existing ESA system are so grave that simply ‘rebranding’ the 
WCA by taking on a new provider will not solve the problems: a fundamental 
redesign of the ESA end-to-end process is required.” 
                                                          
1
 DWP figures, ‘ESA: outcomes of Work Capability Assessments: claims made to Mar 2014 and appeals to Sept 
2014’, available from https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/esa-outcomes-of-work-capability-
assessments-claims-made-to-mar-2014-and-appeals-to-sept-2014 .  All web addresses were valid on 20
th
 Dec 
2014 unless otherwise specified. 
2
 On the fear of the brown envelope, see Garthwaite (2014) and her blog post at 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/archives/37634; similar findings have been reported by the 
researchers Donna Reeve and Ruth Patrick.  On the reported health consequences of the WCA, see the non-
representative poll of 884 sick or disabled people in Burgess et al (2014), in which 95% said that the WCA had 
damaged their health.  On anecdotal reports of the WCA contributing to suicides, see 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-26740651.  
3
 This includes Citizen’s Advice (http://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/not_working), the British Medical 
Association (http://bma.org.uk/news-views-analysis/news/2012/june/scrap-work-capability-assessment-
doctors-demand), and the movement of disabled people known as ‘Spartacus’ 
(http://www.centreforwelfarereform.org/library/type/pdfs/the-peoples-review-of-the-wca.html) among many 
others. 
4
 http://disabilitynewsservice.com/2014/10/incompetence-discrimination-and-fraud-the-us-company-that-
could-take-over-from-atos/  
Similarly, the Labour Party, the Scottish National Party, and many other individual politicians have 
committed themselves to fundamentally overhauling the WCA,5 and the final of five DWP-supported 
independent reviews of the WCA – established by the Welfare Reform Act 2007 – has recently come 
to a similar conclusion. The reviewer, Dr Paul Litchfield, restricted himself to diplomatic language, 
but nevertheless was clearly calling for radical change (2014:3):  
“It appears to me that we have taken the WCA about as far as it can sensibly go 
in terms of modification and adjustment. Work and the workforce are going 
through a period of unprecedented change and it must be questionable whether 
an assessment designed in the early part of this century will best meet society’s 
needs in its third decade. If any new assessment is designed, the fundamental 
question of whether health related capability for work is the criterion that society 
wishes to use to determine benefit levels should first be considered.” 
There is therefore much support for an overhaul of the WCA.  What we do not have, though, is much 
idea of what to replace it with.  The main alternative that has been suggested – a ‘real-world test’ – 
is an important idea but one that has not been fleshed out; the previous independent reviewer of 
the WCA dismissed it on the grounds of a lack of evidence about how it could be carried out (see 
below).  Otherwise there are no think-tank reports setting out an alternative vision for the WCA, nor 
reports by major disability charities, nor analyses by academics – nearly all of whom have either 
been focused on critiquing the WCA and suggesting only minor amendments, or (in the case of the 
OECD) making suggestions for wholesale reform of the incapacity benefit system, rather than setting 
out a blueprint for replacing the WCA specifically.   
Given that all countries that provide support to those unable to work due to disability have to assess 
incapacity at some point, a good starting point is to look at what other countries actually do – 
something we know surprisingly little about.6  In this Demos pamphlet, we therefore set out to 
systematically investigate how seven key countries assess incapacity, and the lessons these countries 
provide for reforming the WCA in the UK.  Before going into the international review, however, we 
firstly set out the state of the UK’s existing assessment in more detail, and why the review focuses 
on the idea of a ‘real-world assessment’.
                                                          
5
 E.g. http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/how-labour-would-reform-the-work-capability-
assessment-9265479.html (Labour), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/scottish-independence-
blog/2014/jun/04/welfare-independent-scotland-referendum-scottish-government-report (SNP), and 
http://www.parliament.uk/edm/2012-13/295 (individual MPs).  
6
 There is a previous review that looks at incapacity assessment in the EU15 countries, but it spends relatively 
little time on the issues that the UK most needs to deal with, and is now over 10 years old (Mabbett, 2003).  A 
few people have started to look beyond Britain’s borders, including the final independent review of the WCA 
by Dr Paul Litchfield (2014), and an influential report from the Spartacus network of disabled people 
(Spartacus Network, 2014), but in both cases the international reviews were brief. 
2. The system as it stands  
As one of us argued in a recent Demos Quarterly publication (Baumberg, 2014b), despite its name, 
the Work Capability Assessment simply does not assess your work capability.  To understand these 
failings of the WCA, we need to go into the detail of the test. 
What the WCA assesses, and what it doesn’t 
While the ESA system as a whole is quite complex, the WCA is a simple test at heart.  It consists of a 
checklist of different possible impairments in different categories, which all have a certain number of 
points attached to them – and if you score 15 points in total across the whole test, you are awarded 
ESA.  So for example: under ‘manual dexterity’, you score as follows (DWP, 2013): 
Descriptor Points 
Cannot either: (i) press a button, such as a telephone keypad; 
or (ii) turn the pages of a book with either hand.  
15  
Cannot pick up a £1 coin or equivalent with either hand.  15  
Cannot use a pen or pencil to make a meaningful mark.  9  
Cannot single-handedly use a suitable keyboard or mouse.  9  
So if you cannot pick up a £1 coin, cannot press a button, or cannot turn the pages of a book, then 
you score 15 points and are awarded ESA.  If you cannot use a pen/pencil, then you score only 9 
points – and unless you have another impairment, or you fit one of the ‘special’ or ‘exceptional’ 
circumstances,7 then you are considered fit-for-work.  
This test is clear and simple in principle – the trouble is that it does not assess work capacity.  It is 
quite difficult to find a clear statement of what the WCA is designed to measure; but in the words of 
the DWP’s Technical Working Group (2007) who designed the test, the WCA “focuses solely on 
people’s level of function”, which is not the same as incapacity.  To explain why it is different, it is 
worth clarifying at this point exactly what ‘work capacity’ means.   
Policymakers worldwide have long dreamed about a definitive medical assessment of incapacity, 
where the most trusted of professionals – doctors – scientifically determine people’s capacity for 
work (Stone, 1984).  Yet this is a chimera, which disabled people and disability experts dismissively 
refer to as the old-fashioned ‘medical model’.  Instead, the insight of the ‘social model’ is that 
disability depends on how the world is organised, and whether society itself ‘disables’ people with 
functional impairments.  When it comes to the workplace, few medical diagnoses or functional 
impairments are so severe that you cannot do any jobs whatsoever; in the LSE-founder Sidney 
                                                          
7
 People can fail to score 15 points but still quality for ESA if… 
 …being found fit-for-work would lead to ‘a substantial risk to the mental or physical health of any 
person’, as long as this would not be significantly reduced by ‘reasonable adjustments’ or ‘taking 
medication’; 
 …they are ‘terminally ill’ (death expected within 6mths), or suffering from ‘a severe life-threatening 
disease’ that is ‘uncontrolled’ by any ‘recognised therapeutic procedure’;  
 …they have (or are recovering from) cancer, subject to a series of other conditions; 
 …they are undergoing in-patient treatment, including residential addictions treatment, or sometimes 
during whole weeks during which they have certain types of treatment (e.g. haemodialysis); 
 …they are in full-time education/training and receive DLA; 
 …they are pregnant and meet a series of other conditions. 
Webb’s words in 1912 (in Gulland, 2011), ‘incapable of any work whatsoever’ can only mean ‘literally 
unconscious or asleep’.  For everyone else, incapacity depends on whether your limitations interfere 
with the requirements of the particular job in question. And this goes beyond the bounds of medical 
science.   
According to best practice in occupational health (Palmer and Cox, 2013), the starting point of any 
credible assessment should therefore be to compare people’s impairments with the requirements of 
work.  Yet while vaguely being related to work,8 at no stage does the WCA assess the work that a 
claimant may or may not be able to do.  The WCA is a standardised, seemingly objective assessment, 
but this comes at the cost of failing to measure what it purports to; it could be better thought of as a 
measure of ‘whether a person should be required to seek work’, rather than actually measuring 
incapacity (Mabbett, 2003:46).9   
Real-world incapacity 
There is also a second sense in which the WCA does not assess work incapacity: it ignores people’s 
differing abilities to find or keep a job they can do.  One of us has previously called this the ‘Stephen 
Hawking effect’: just because Stephen Hawking is working does not mean that other people with the 
same impairments should be considered fit-for-work.  Likewise, an impairment that is unproblematic 
for a 25-year old graduate in the more buoyant labour market in the South-East of England may be 
an insurmountable barrier to work for a 63-year old man with no qualifications in the more 
depressed local economy of Easington, County Durham. Incapacity assessments that take this into 
account have recently been termed ‘real-world’ assessments (e.g. Citizens Advice, 2010), on the 
grounds that they look at whether a person with impairments would realistically be able to find a job 
they can do, given who they are.   
However, this should be seen as a family of real-world assessments rather than a single model.  Most 
versions of real-world assessment would look at personal factors such as (i) age; (ii) education and 
qualifications; and (iii) work experience.  In principle, though, it would be possible to have real-world 
assessments that also consider (iv) the local labour market; (v) the national economic situation; or 
(vi) other barriers to work such as caring responsibilities, all of which will influence whether a person 
with an impairment is able to get or keep a suitable job.  There are good reasons why some of these 
factors are more desirable in an incapacity assessment than others, and we explore this below.  
Another approach is to look at what we might call ‘demonstrated incapacity’, where people’s 
inability to find work is shown in the real world over a sustained period of time. 
To reiterate: real-world assessment looks at whether someone’s functional impairments interfere 
with their ability to get or keep a job, given who they are.  It therefore intrinsically takes into 
account functional impairments alongside the non-medical factors (such as employability) that make 
it easier or harder for different people to work.  
                                                          
8
 The WCA descriptors of functioning are vaguely related to work – a clear statement is difficult to find, but the 
DWP’s Technical Working Group (2007) suggests that the WCA compares people to the “functional capability 
that a reasonable employer would expect of his workforce.”  Yet this makes no sense when looking at 
combinations of impairments; impairments have been assigned an arbitrary severity score, which is then 
added to another severity score, irrespective of whether there are any jobs that someone with that particular 
combination of impairments might be able to do.  Moreover, the Technical Working Group seems not to have 
actually looked at any actual jobs that someone with lower levels of impairments might be able to do. 
9
 This is similar to the most recent statement by DWP when pressed at the Work and Pensions Select 
Committee 2014 (q443 in the Oral Evidence session of 11
th
 June 2014), where James Bolton of DWP said that 
“the WCA is not looking for someone who is fully fit for work.  It completely recognises that people with health 
conditions and disabilities can work, and it tries to recognise that it is not unreasonable to expect people with 
health conditions and disabilities to work, but there are some for whom it probably is not reasonable.  That is 
what it is attempting to do.” 
Challenges for real-world assessment   
To the extent that people have advocated a firm alternative to the WCA, they have been advocating 
for a real-world type of test. This includes the Spartacus network of disabled people (2014) and a 
number of charities led by Citizens’ Advice (Citizens Advice, 2010), and it has even been discussed by 
the DWP’s independent reviewers of the WCA. The first reviewer, Prof Malcolm Harrington, gave it 
serious consideration in his annual review in 2010, while his successor, Dr Paul Litchfield, strongly 
hinted he favoured a version of real-world assessment in the final independent review: 
"The current assessment model, though founded on capability rather than 
diagnosis, retains a strong medical flavour. Modern thinking favours a 
biopsychosocial10 model of disability, which considers not just capability but also 
other factors such as skills and readiness for the labour market.”  
But it is not that simple.  As one of us has described in a recent Demos Quarterly publication,11 there 
are a number of challenges in introducing real-world assessments in the real world.  Firstly, as Chris 
Grayling MP (then Minister of State for Employment) said in 2011: 
“The one thing I am absolutely unreservedly and implacably opposed to in all of 
this is a real world test. Either somebody is fit for work or they are not, and what I 
am not prepared to do is to countenance a situation where we are saying: “You 
are fit for work, but you should not be on JSA because there is high 
unemployment in your area.” …What I do not think we could possibly 
countenance is the situation where we are saying, “Because of circumstances in 
the labour market in your area, we will treat you differently.” I think that would 
be a huge mistake.” 
Grayling seems to be arguing that that it does not seem fair and right that the same people in 
different areas of the country are treated differently – a view we have heard across the political 
spectrum.  However, this only applies to spatially-specific tests (i.e. where local labour markets are 
taken into account); part of the problem with these debates has been that the various different 
meanings of the ‘real-world’ element have been blurred.  We return to this explicitly in our 
concluding chapter. 
Secondly, the idea of a real-world test has been advocated, but no-one has provided any detail 
about what a real-world test might actually look like.  At the request of Citizen’s Advice, Prof Richard 
Berthoud (2011) produced an excellent analysis of the issues, but with little guidance as to the 
practicalities of real-world assessments.  The independent reviewer of the WCA at the time, Malcolm 
Harrington, thus concluded that the UK’s collected experts were “unable to offer clear, evidence 
based advice on what a real world test might look like” (Harrington, 2011:37).   
One worry here is that a real-world test could blur into unemployment insurance. For spatially-
specific tests in particular, unemployed people in areas with few jobs will have a low bar to claiming 
incapacity benefits, even if their impairment is not the reason that they are out-of-work. It is widely 
believed that GPs were more willing to sign people off sick in deindustrialising areas in Britain in the 
1980s (though there is no direct available evidence to confirm it), as well as in other countries such 
as the Netherlands, where levels of incapacity claims rose to unprecedented levels.  While this 
                                                          
10
 Litchfield’s use of the term ‘biopsychosocial’ here differs slightly from conventional uses of the term, which 
focus on psychological/cultural reactions to disability and the idea that people’s main problem is the way they 
think about their disability.  However, it is a contested term – for an insight into its politics, see 
http://blacktrianglecampaign.org/2012/09/15/unumdwpatos-scandal-transcript-prof-sir-mansel-aylward-
defends-his-record-makes-pledge-when-confronted-by-black-triangle-and-dpac-at-ifdm2012/. 
11
 (Baumberg, 2014b) 
challenge arises primarily because of the nature of incapacity – an impairment is genuinely more 
incapacitating for people who have lower employability – real-world tests still need to demonstrate 
that they can still meaningfully differentiate incapacity from unemployment. 
A real-world test is therefore an attractive idea, but we need to know more about if it can work – 
and how it can work – before it can be seen as a real alternative to the WCA.  These are the 
questions that this report tries to answer. 
The functions of the WCA 
The WCA is therefore failing in its task of assessing incapacity, but this is not its only function.  
Potentially an incapacity assessment could also influence both the conditionality and the 
conditionality employment support that claimants receive – yet the WCA also fails on both of these 
counts too.   
Conditionality and the WCA 
Aside from determining eligibility for ESA, the WCA splits claimants into two groups based on their 
‘capability for work-related activity’.  Those who are assessed as having this capability are placed in 
the Work-Related Activity Group (WRAG), and are forced to attend regular work-focused interviews 
and perform other work-related activity (voluntary work, work trials, or training) – otherwise they 
are sanctioned.  Alternatively, those assessed as not having a ‘capability for work-related activity’ are 
placed in the Support group, who not only have no conditionality, but are also awarded a higher 
level of benefit, which (unlike for the WRAG group) is not means-tested after 12 months.  This 
second-stage assessment therefore has high stakes, and it has been subject to considerable 
controversy and revision. 
The actual ‘work-related activity’ capability test is based on the ‘work’ capability test – it uses the 
same descriptors – but has two main differences.12  Firstly, multiple less severe impairments do not 
‘add up’ to a more severe impairment; it only assesses the most severe impairment that you have. 
Secondly, there are several impairments that are considered reason alone for limited work 
capability, but are still not sufficient to count as limited capability for ‘work-related activity’ at the 
second stage.  For example, you are eligible for ESA if you ‘cannot pick up a £1 coin or equivalent 
with either hand’, but if this was your only impairment, then you would be placed in the WRAG 
rather than the Support Group.  (We briefly return to the issue of conditionality in JSA and Universal 
Credit in Chapter 4 below). 
There has been much confusion about why people are placed in the WRAG rather than the Support 
Group.  Partly this is because the Coalition Government introduced a one-year time-limit for WRAG 
claimants that took effect in 2012, arguing that the WRAG was “an interim measure for those who 
are expected to move into work” (Kennedy, 2012), and partly it is because WRAG claimants do 
receive a ‘prognosis’ of when they are expected to be fit for work, which governs entry into the 
Work Programme.  As a result, it is often assumed that people are meant to be put in the WRAG if 
they are expected to be ready to return to work in the near future, and it is on these grounds that 
five charities complained that those with progressive conditions are sometimes wrongly allocated to 
the WRAG (Cystic Fibrosis Trust et al., 2014).  Yet we believe the confusion is also because the ‘work-
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 ‘Special’ or ‘exceptional’ circumstances for being placed in the Support group include when… 
 …being placed in the WRAG would lead to ‘a substantial risk to the mental or physical health of any 
person’; 
 …they are ‘terminally ill’ (death expected within 6mths);  
 …they have (or are recovering from) cancer, subject to a series of other conditions; 
 …they are pregnant and meet a series of other conditions. 
related activity’ test is not very closely related to people’s ability to do work-related activity, 
mirroring the problems of the work capability in assessing incapacity.  
Employment support and the WCA 
Beyond such ‘eligibility assessments’, the WCA also misses an opportunity to conduct a ‘diagnostic 
assessment’ (Coleman and Parry, 2011) of the support that claimants actually need to get back to 
work.  These assessments are necessary to determine how much money Work Programme providers 
are given (which currently is crudely based on which benefits people have received) and for 
providing claimants with personalised support to help them return-to-work, which should happen as 
early as possible in people’s claim.  Yet the WCA does not attempt to provide any information on the 
work that people could do, or the help they would need to return to work.  Jobcentre Plus does 
conduct separate needs assessments with new claimants, but these are not consistent and do not 
provide the detailed information required, so Work Programme providers do their own assessments 
after clients are referred to them – a situation that seems unlikely to change even with the 
Government’s proposed introduction of a new ‘Gateway’ assessment to disability employment 
support (Department for Work and Pensions, 2013). 
There are good reasons to split diagnostic and eligibility assessments – diagnostic assessments need 
to focus on what people can do and what support they need rather than their eligibility for benefit 
(Coleman and Parry, 2011), and there are certain factors (such as motivation) that are critical in 
assessing employment support needs but which we would not want to take into account in 
determining benefit eligibility.  A previous international review has found that many countries 
therefore separate these two processes out (Mabbett, 2003:56).  However, incapacity assessment 
could certainly contribute much more to this process, both in terms of influencing contractual 
payment levels for employment support, and in providing the information required to personalise 
support.  There have been several calls by think tanks (Coleman and Parry, 2011), disability charities, 
politicians (Work and Pensions Committee, 2014) and the independent reviewer of the WCA 
(Litchfield, 2014) to capture more of this information at the time of the WCA.  But as it stands, Work 
Programme providers cannot even see the information on functional impairments that the WCA 
does provide (much as the DWP is promising to change this in 2015).   
This was foreseen when ESA was being designed, and a further ‘Work Focusing Health-Related 
Assessment’ (WFHRA) was proposed from the outset.  The WFHRA was a second assessment done 
by Atos in the early years of ESA, originally by the same assessor as the WCA on the same day, and 
focused on the claimant’s own views of the support that would help them move back to work. 
However, the WFHRA was suspended in July 2010, after a review found that neither claimants nor 
Jobcentre staff were clear about its purpose.  We are left with a situation in which many experts are 
calling for an early assessment to look at claimants’ employment support needs, eight years after the 
original WCA design team thought they had addressed this issue. 
Could we do without an incapacity assessment? 
There is no realistic way of avoiding all disability-related assessments in the welfare state – disabled 
people have higher costs to reach the same standard of living, and we therefore need extra cost 
benefits (DLA/PIP) to avoid high levels of disability-related poverty (MacInnes et al., 2014).13  But 
beyond this, and given the unpopularity of the WCA, some people have proposed a world without 
incapacity assessments beyond this.  One version would be to have a single flat-rate out-of-work 
benefit, with disabled people compensated through a more generous extra costs benefit (as Demos 
argue in their 2013 report Something for Something), in which conditionality and employment 
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 It is worth noting that the DLA and PIP assessments have their own challenges – claimants expect them to be 
more medicalised than they are (Gray, 2014), and the test does not attempt to assess the actual costs that 
people face, instead relying on functional impairments as a proxy. 
support could be given on a personalised basis.  Alternatively, some disability advocates argue in 
favour of a basic income, in which the issue of conditionality would not arise. 
We think that these ideas are problematic – even if some countries have started to move in this 
direction.  It is possible to offer support on a personalised basis rather than via a separate category 
of ‘disability’, but in practice this means lower support and worse outcomes for disabled people 
(Heap, 2014), and there is still a need to assess how much money a welfare-to-work provider will be 
given to support each claimant.  It is more plausible to imagine a world with a single flat-rate out-of-
work benefit in which conditionality and employment support needs are assessed through a lower-
stakes incapacity test.  Even here, there are 600,000 longer-term ESA claimants not receiving an 
extra cost benefit in the UK, who would suffer considerable losses in such a reform.  And in the long-
term, disabled people are also often thought of as more ‘deserving’ than unemployment benefit 
claimants, and their benefits are more generous.14  Abandoning the category of ‘incapacity’ will 
eventually mean a reduction in the popularity and generosity of support for disabled people.   
Incapacity assessment developed in many countries over the twentieth century to meet a societal 
need, and if anything we believe this need has grown.  In our view, the challenge is how to make it 
work better than the WCA does at present. 
The accuracy of the WCA 
The WCA is widely perceived to be an inaccurate measure of incapacity, and we have good reasons 
for thinking that it assessing the wrong thing – but actually estimating the accuracy of the WCA is 
difficult.15  As it was being developed, the WCA was tested in 212 cases, but as an article in the BMJ 
noted at the time, "the new test claims to be fair and accurate, but the report does not define what 
this means” (Verbeek and van Dijk, 2008). In fact, it was being assessed against ‘expert opinion’, 
without telling us what the experts were actually assessing, and without considering that expert 
opinion can be wrong.  A similar problem besets the more recent DWP ‘Evidence-Based Review’, 
which compared 600 WCAs against the opinion of a group of experts.  This time we were told that 
the expert panel “identified that 83% of claimants deemed fit for work would need “on average, two 
or three” adjustments; 50% would need flexible working hours; and 24% would need a support 
worker” (Work and Pensions Committee, 2014).  While we still do not exactly know what the expert 
panel were assessing, it is clear that they were looking at people’s ability to do a generic job with a 
considerable level of adjustments, which is perhaps stricter than many people’s idea of ‘incapacity’.   
In the absence of an easy measure of accuracy, commentators have tended to focus on successful 
WCA appeals as a measure of inaccuracy.16  In the early days of the WCA, nearly half of those found 
fit-for-work appealed – over quarter of the total caseload – and over 40% of these decisions were 
being overturned by the tribunals.  Freedom of Information requests revealed that the majority of 
decisions being overturned at this time had initially received zero points rather than being marginal 
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 The greater public support for disabled vs. unemployed people is shown each year in British Social Attitudes 
Survey reports, and can be seen across time and place (van Oorschot, 2000); see also Bambra & Smith (2010). 
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 This section focuses on the accuracy of the WCA in assessing incapacity, rather than the accuracy of Atos in 
assessing the WCA, which itself has been criticised – one study found that 16 of the 37 reports studied had 
serious inaccuracies (Citizens Advice, 2012) – and was one of the reasons the DWP gave for the termination of 
the Atos contract above. 
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 Figures taken from http://www.justice.gov.uk/statistics/tribunals and 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/employment-and-support-allowance-outcomes-of-work-
capability-assessment.  Note that these refer to initial assessments rather than repeat assessments or 
reassesments, as these are likely to be more comparable over time. 
decisions.17  However, the numbers of appeals have since collapsed, from 40,000-110,000 per 
quarter 2009-2013, to around 10,000 per quarter over the last year.  While there are several 
possible reasons for this, the main one is probably the introduction of ‘mandatory reconsideration’, 
which acts as a strong disincentive for people to appeal, and may mean that many wrong decisions 
are no longer being challenged.18 
It is impossible to talk about the WCA, though, without looking at how the WCA outcomes have 
changed over time.  At the start of ESA in late 2008, over half of claimants were eventually found fit-
for-work after taking into account appeals, with 35% being placed in the WRAG, and 11% in the 
Support Group.  By early 2013 this had changed dramatically, with only 33% being found fit-for-
work, 23% being placed in the WRAG, and 44% in the Support Group.19  Partly this reflects changes 
to the WCA in January 2013 and particularly March 2011, which were designed to increase the 
numbers going into the Support Group.  However, it also reflects changes that were not predicted, in 
particular around the use of the special circumstances regulation where people are considered to be 
at a substantial risk of harm if found fit-for-work.20  The Treasury’s budget-by-budget estimates of 
spending on ESA have therefore continually been revised upwards, and there is a possibility that 
new changes to ESA will be unveiled to reduce spending back to its originally projected levels. 
There are two implications of this.   Firstly, the WCA that was introduced in 2008 is a quite different 
beast from the WCA that is now being implemented, and some of the concerns that have been 
raised may fade away as people become aware of the changes.  Yet while it is possible to make the 
test more or less generous, the charge that we are making – that the test simply does not assess 
people’s capacity for work – cannot be addressed without a fundamental overhaul of the WCA.  
Secondly, these changes demonstrate how a system set out in legislation can be affected by 
changing street-level practices (much as some of the changes over time have been underpinned by 
statutory instruments).  This review concentrates on systems and principles, but we must always 
remember that the way that these are implemented in practice is no less important, much as this is 
harder to look at across different countries. 
Rethinking the WCA using international evidence 
While this review is focused on learning from international evidence, it was firstly necessary to 
understand the WCA as it currently stands.  This chapter has therefore set out why the WCA fails to 
assess incapacity, how it links poorly to conditionality and employment support, and what we know 
about the accuracy of the WCA (and how this has changed over time).  We now turn to the main 
focus of our review: the next chapter describes how other countries have designed their incapacity 
assessment, while the concluding chapter brings this together into lessons for rethinking the WCA. 
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 http://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=2011-06-28b.61405.h  
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 ‘Mandatory reconsideration’ requires people to request the DWP to reconsider their decision before 
launching an appeal – and to claim JSA in the meantime.  The Government themselves have claimed that the 
fall in appeals is due to this; see https://www.gov.uk/government/news/minister-welcomes-sharp-fall-in-
appeals-against-benefit-decisions  
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 The results look even more striking for claims made in recent months, but this may partly be because there 
are increasing numbers of claims in progress (particularly given the backlogs in ESA assessments that have 
made the headlines) – for example, as of the statistical release on 11
th
 Dec 2014, over one-quarter of the 
claims from Jan 2014 are still in progress.  As the DWP note in their statistical releases, the cases resolved first 
are those where people are least likely to be found fit-for-work, and this is likely to skew the trend. 
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 The use of this regulation has increased from 2-3% of all completed assessments in 2009 to over 20% of 
completed assessments in mid-2013; see also Litchfield (2014:36-38), which presents further evidence that 
most of these cases concern mental health. 
3. International case studies 
In our review we chose to look at two sets of countries.  We look at the Anglo-Saxon countries 
(Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA), which in many ways have welfare systems that are 
most similar to the UK.  To complement this, we also look at three social democratic countries 
(Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden) – these are countries that we knew consider real-world 
incapacity in some way, and invest substantially in issues around work and disability and might 
therefore contain some examples of best practice. These are also the countries that seem to be 
influential in UK debate; they include the four countries mentioned in Dr Litchfield’s review, and 
most of the countries that underpin the call for real-world assessment in the recent Spartacus 
report.   
The rest of this chapter presents short summaries of incapacity assessment in each of these 
countries.  We should however stress that it is always challenging in UK-based international reviews 
to obtain the level of detail we would like on the latest reforms, particularly for the social democratic 
countries where most policy documents are not available in English. We have attempted to 
triangulate our understanding across a range of sources within each country, but there are some 
areas where uncertainty remains – we make clear below where this is the case. 
New Zealand21 
When Dr Paul Litchfield was drawing on international evidence for his recent independent review of 
the WCA, he was particularly interested in the lessons from New Zealand.  Ironically, policymakers in 
New Zealand in recent years have been inspired by the UK’s approach, and this cautions us against 
celebrating international examples before it is clear if they were successful – the latest New Zealand 
reforms date from 2013, and it will be a few years before we get a clear picture how they work (as 
Litchfield himself notes).  Still, the broad outlines of the system are clear. 
Incapacity benefits 
New Zealand operates two benefits:   
 Supported Living Payment: A dedicated incapacity benefit still exists for those with severe 
disabilities – the ‘Supported Living Payment’, with no conditionality applied.  However, you 
cannot receive this until you have had a condition affecting your work capacity for two years 
(unless you are terminally ill or blind).  Even after two years, SLP is only available for those who 
are incapable of part-time work.   
 Jobseeker’s Support: Everyone else is placed on the main out-of-work benefit, ‘Jobseeker’s 
Support’, which is paid at a flat rate (with variations by age and family size); SLP pays 25% more 
than Jobseeker’s Support.  Sick/disabled claimants of Jobseeker’s Support are placed in one of 
two groups: (i) mild work capacity limitation (able to do part-time work of 15-29 hrs/wk), and (ii) 
severe work capacity limitation (not fit for part-time work).  Obligations are placed on all 
sick/disabled claimants (other than blind or terminally ill people) in the first two years, and these 
are more stringent than in the UK: those with mild work capacity limitations have a seemingly 
onerous set of part-time work obligations, while even those with severe limitations who are 
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 This summary is based on (Lunt and Horsfall, 2013; Fleming and Page, 2010; Work and Income New Zealand, 
undated), as well as the websites of The Social Security (Benefit Categories and Work Focus) Amendment Act 
2013 (http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2013/0013/latest/DLM4542304.html), Work and Income New 
Zealand (http://www.workandincome.govt.nz/individuals/), the New Zealand Citizen’s Advice Bureau 
(http://www.cab.org.nz/vat/money/ben/Pages/DisabilityAllowances.aspx), and the New Zealand Social Justice 
Blog (http://nzsocialjusticeblog2013.wordpress.com).  
often described as having a ‘temporary exemption’ from work requirements nevertheless have 
‘work preparation obligations’. 
Assessment of eligibility 
What is particularly striking is that the incapacity assessment is based on a remarkably simple ‘Work 
Capacity Medical Certificate’ filled out by the claimant’s medical practitioner (like the UK in the 
past), paid for by the claimant where necessary.  The form asks about the level and duration of 
incapacity directly (e.g. whether the claimants medical conditions ‘limit the person’s capacity to 
work for 30 hours or more per week’, and if so, how long this will last), with little further guidance 
provided, other than stating that work is good for health.  Benefit eligibility is then decided by 
benefits agency staff, based on the form alongside their interactions with the client and the clients’ 
self-assessment.   
However, benefits agency staff can refer a claimant for a second opinion, on the grounds that the 
information from the form is unclear or ambiguous, the initial doctor feels inadequately qualified, 
the claimant wants a second opinion, or because the benefits agency staff think that ‘the person is 
engaged in activities that appear to be at odds with recorded incapacities or with work capacity 
information’.  Technically the independent doctor can be selected by the claimant, but in practice it 
seems that the agency suggests people from their ‘designated doctors’ list.  People can go to the 
Medical Appeals Board if they are unhappy with the decision; this is made up of 
medical/rehabilitation professionals chosen by the Ministry, and there is no further right of appeal. 
Lessons for the UK 
It is very difficult to assess how well the new system is working – partly because it is so new, and 
partly because the level of transparency is poor; for example, New Zealanders themselves complain 
that no statistics are routinely published on appeals or sanctions.  And even knowing how the 
system looks on paper, the high degree of discretion that seems to be given to the benefits agency 
makes it difficult to know how strict the eligibility testing is, or how often sanctions are applied.  In 
terms of the brute numbers, though, and according to the official data that tries to make the pre- 
and post-reform systems comparable, Jobseeker’s Support claims have fallen since the July 2013 
reforms (from 129k to 123k), but Supported Living Payment claims have increased (84k to 85k).  
Nearly half of all claimants of Jobseeker’s Support are currently classified as having a health 
condition or disability. 
As a final word, it is worth considering the WCA independent reviewer Paul Litchfield’s comments on 
New Zealand.  Litchfield was interested by “the approach of uncoupling levels of benefit eligibility 
from work capability” and their focus “on overcoming barriers to employment”, which he says “has 
appeal and merits further exploration”.  However, the benefit eligibility assessment above is not a 
helpful measure of employment support needs.  (This instead needs to be assessed in an entirely 
separate ‘Work Capability Assessment’ with an independent medical specialist, which Jobseeker’s 
Support claimants can be forced to undergo).  Far from being an innovative new example, this in fact 
takes us back to the original ESA system of the WFHRA (see Chapter 2), and it is not clear here that 
the New Zealand system offers any ‘real-world’ lessons that the UK has not already learnt.   
Australia22 
Incapacity benefits 
New Zealand’s system seems to have been partly inspired by Australia’s, which since 2006 has 
likewise had a distinction between a low-level general out-of-work benefit (‘Newstart Allowance’) 
and a dedicated incapacity benefit that pays 50% more (‘Disability Support Pension’, DSP).  Many 
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and Wilkins, 2013; Galvin, 2004; Mays, 2012; Department of Social Services, 2015).  
sick and disabled people will not be eligible for DSP for three reasons.  Firstly, DSP is only for people 
who cannot work part-time (15+ hrs/wk).  Secondly, DSP is only for people with a ‘continuing 
inability for work’ lasting two or more years into the future.  Thirdly, since 2011, nearly everyone 
applying for DSP has to show that they have already ‘actively participated’ in a program of support 
for 18 months, with exceptions only for ‘severely disabled’ people.23  This means that people who 
are temporarily disabled, or whose disability makes them unable to work full-time, or indeed most 
disabled people in the first 18 months of their claim, will only be eligible for Newstart Allowance.  
Partly as a consequence, around half of Newstart Allowance claimants are exempt from jobsearch 
requirements at any one time. 
Assessment of eligibility 
The assessment for DSP is known as the ‘Job Capacity Assessment’ (JCA), and is done by Job Capacity 
Assessors employed by the Department of Human Services, based on a medical/functioning report 
by the claimants’ own doctor.  The JCA includes both an impairment table and an assessment of 
‘continuing inability to work’.  The impairment table is a functional capacity test that is not dissimilar 
to the WCA, with claimants needing to score 20 points to be eligible for DSP.  The ‘continuing 
inability to work’ test assesses whether someone is unable to work 15+ hrs/wk, and whether this will 
last two years - ‘work’ meaning any job paying the minimum wage in Australia.  The assessment 
explicitly states that the availability of work is not considered, nor are people’s other employability 
barriers (e.g. literacy difficulties) unrelated to their medical condition, or how employers would react 
to them. However, there are some small elements of a real-world test.  The “physical and intellectual 
characteristics which would be required to perform any work” are explicitly considered, as is a 
person’s ability to in practice to re-skill into a different occupation within two years. 
Lessons for the UK  
Dr Litchfield’s view was that Australia could offer lessons to the UK as the JCA is “used to identify 
barriers to work an individual may face and refer for appropriate support.” Indeed, the JCA formally 
commits itself to establishing a claimant’s “barriers to finding and maintaining employment and any 
interventions/assistance that may be required to help improve their current work capacity”, with the 
reports sent on to their employment services provider.  This information comes from the second 
part of the test (the impairment tables are similar to the WCA), and the main lesson is therefore that 
a WCA-style test can be accompanied by a further simultaneous assessment of what work an 
individual can actually do – a lesson that we will see repeated for several further countries.24  
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 ‘Severe disability’ is similar to the assessment for the Support Group in the UK – it’s about whether the most 
disabling single impairment that a claimant has would be enough to qualify them for DSP, ignoring the 
combined impact of multiple impairments.  Note that some people are also considered to have ‘actively 
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 It is also worth noting that the disability assessment that the (British) Labour Party have been talking about 
in Australia is a separate system, NDIS, which provides self-directed support for disabled people.  NDIS is 
unrelated to the system of income replacement benefits, and given headlines like ‘Blitz on welfare to fund 
national disability insurance scheme’ [The Australian, 24/12/2014], we may even see declining income 
protection for some disabled people to fund greater generosity in NDIS to others.   
Denmark25 
Incapacity benefits 
Denmark has a relatively long-lasting and generous sickness benefit, followed by a disability pension 
(‘Fortidspension’).  The most distinctive feature of the system though is the much-cited flex-job 
(‘Fleksjob’) scheme, which provides substantial wage subsidies – often over half of the wage – to 
sick/disabled people.  After being introduced in 2003, the numbers of people in flex-jobs has 
increased considerably; the overall number of sickness/disability claimants has not reduced, but the 
employment rate of people with health problems has increased.   One problem is that fewer flex-
jobs are available than the numbers who are eligible for them, with people being paid a waiting 
benefit (at the same level as sickness benefit and unemployment benefit) while waiting; there have 
also been recent attempts to restrict eligibility to the scheme. 
Assessment of eligibility 
Health limitations are initially assessed by the claimants’ GP, before being reviewed by a municipality 
medical advisor who can ask a specialist for a second opinion.  However, the actual assessment 
process is the decision of a social worker employed by the municipality, and uses something called 
the ‘Resource Profile.  This looks at twelve diverse dimensions of the claimant’s situation: i) 
education and skills; ii) labour market experience; iii) interests; iv) social competence; v) re-
adjustment ability; vi) learning ability; vii) job preferences; viii) performance expectations; ix) work 
identity; x) dwelling and finances; xi) social network; and xii) health.  In the UK, Dr Litchfield 
approvingly stressed how only one part of the profile concerns health, and – much as health is 
reported to be a critical factor in 95% of cases – this again highlights the non-medical, ‘real-world’ 
elements in assessment. 
Having completed the Resource Profile, it is then the social workers decision as to whether the 
claimant can perform a normal job or a flex-job, giving the social workers some discretion – although 
less than existed in the past.  If the claimant can do a normal job then they are ineligible for the 
benefit; if they can do a flex-job, then they wait for a suitable flex-job to become available; and if 
they cannot do a flex-job, then they receive the disability pension.  Few claimants are rejected from 
incapacity-related benefits outright but few seem to be eligible for the disability pension at the 
outset (and indeed most under-40s have recently been barred from claiming it). The relevant 
legislation requires that early retirement pensions are only granted when other options are 
exhausted, hence social workers will try a number of different activation activities before someone is 
considered completely incapable for even subsidised work. 
This was the picture for much of the past decade – but in 2013 the process of assessment was 
overhauled into an assessment tool called the Resource Cycle (‘Ressourceforløb’), following several 
years of pilots.  Rather than starting with the claimant’s GP, this starts with an interview with a 
‘return-to-work coordinator’ (basically a sickness benefit officer), who maps the claimant’s 
employment situation and completes a screening of their support needs.  Where an in-depth work 
capacity assessment is required, the coordinator sets up a multidisciplinary conference between an 
occupational therapist, a psychologist and a psychiatrist, which focuses on what the person can do 
(how many hours someone can work, from what point, and with what accommodations), and what 
barriers need to be addressed (which can lead to appointments with a psychologist to address work 
motivation, or with the employer to address workplace barriers).  Little English-language information 
is available on either the workings or the successes of the new system, other than early reports that 
local authorities were struggling to deliver the initiative as intended. 
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Lessons for the UK 
Both the Spartacus review and the Litchfield review discuss the Danish system, partly because 
"Denmark has long been considered to be a European exemplar for how best to handle sickness and 
disability-related issues in employment" (Heap, 2014).  However, this appears to be changing.  
Having flagged the Resource Profile as potential best practice, the OECD recently concluded that the 
Resource Profile “is now considered a failure” in practice, because of its complexity, lack of guidance,  
lack of integration with employment support and its failings in assessing mental health limitations.  
The latest reforms thus introduce yet another assessment process, which is simpler and focused 
more on linking to employment support, as well as cutting the totemic flex-jobs scheme.  Still, the 
Danish system is the first here to demonstrate that systems can take real-world factors into account. 
Sweden26 
Incapacity benefits 
In Sweden, people who are not working due to ill-health or disability claim a relatively generous 
sickness benefit (‘Sjukpenning’), which since 2008 takes them into a clearly-defined process aiming 
to get them back to work.  Those employed at the time of sickness/disability often have a meeting 
with an assessor (and often their employer, doctor and/or rehabilitation specialist) within 90 days to 
see if/how they can return to work; this both checks their eligibility for benefit and investigates 
options for workplace adjustments.  If they are still on sickness benefit after 180 days, then they 
have to start looking at other jobs they might do with help from the public employment service.  It is 
only if incapacity is considered permanent (often after long periods claiming sickness benefit) that 
some claimants move on to the permanent disability benefit (‘Sjukersättning’); or if they are under 
30, to the less permanent activity compensation, (‘Aktivitetsersättning’), which either the individual 
or their caseworker applies for. 
Assessment of eligibility 
Within this process, functional ability is assessed by the caseworker based on reports from the 
claimant’s doctor, but the state insurance agency can undertake its own in-house assessments using 
its team of work life psychologists, occupational therapists, and social welfare supervisors.   
Formally, the state insurance agency caseworkers are assessing whether the claimant has any 
‘functional impairments that entail reduced work capacity’, which it can determine as being 25%, 
50%, 75%, or total incapacity.  This is not defined in law, but internal documents state that “work 
capacity is determined by the interplay of a job seeker’s individual characteristics, a specific work 
task, and the work environment” – and this also involves looking at the jobs that a person might 
actually be able to get.  As Garsten and Jacobsson put it, “it is not enough to test work capacity in 
relation to a fictional labour market. The public employment service has to try to find an actual 
existing job for the person in question”.   
Lessons for the UK 
The lessons from Sweden are therefore similar to those from Denmark: incapacity assessment can 
be tightly linked to employment support, and it can also consider real-world factors in terms of both 
personal characteristics and demonstrated incapacity (where real-world failures to find work while 
on sickness benefits are used by claimants and caseworkers to argue they have a permanently 
reduced ability to work).  Where Sweden differs, though, is that it is seen as a success story by the 
OECD after the ‘remarkable fall’ in sickness and disability claims over the past ten years.  The price to 
be paid for this is a high benefit rejection rate, which has led even the OECD to note that there are 
“concerns that the disability system may have become too strict”.   
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One further feature is worth noting, as it is so unusual: the existence of a category of ‘socio-medical 
disability’. This is not caused by a medically-diagnosed condition, but instead reflects non-medical 
workplace disadvantages, such as a criminal background or Swedish language difficulties among 
immigrants.  To understand why this make sense, we need to look at the context: insurance agency 
staff choose to classify someone as ‘disabled’ in order to access more generous support that they 
need to get someone back into work.  Classifying someone as socio-medically disabled has been 
seen as a way of levelling out an unequal labour market, even if they have no health conditions in a 
medical sense.  This deliberate blurring of unemployment and incapacity offers a revealing contrast 
with other countries’ focus on their separation.  
Canada27 
Incapacity benefits 
The Canadian system is fiendishly complex: disabled people have to navigate 6-8 income support 
programmes split between private insurers, federal government, and the provincial governments.  
We focus on the federal system (outside Quebec), which is split between a very short-term sickness 
benefit of up to fifteen weeks, and the main Canada Pension Plan disability benefit (CPP-D).  Both of 
these are restricted to people who have strong work attachments in the past few years, so around 
half of disabled claimants instead receive the disabled component of provincial non-contributory 
Social Assistance.   
Assessment of eligibility 
Incapacity within CPP-D is assessed by a medical adjudicator employed by the government 
department, ‘Social Development Canada’, with decisions made by a separate insurance officer.  
They assess whether the claimants have a ‘severe and prolonged disability’, each part of which is 
assessed separately:28   
- The simplest part, ‘disability’, just means that a person has a medical condition.  The medical 
adjudicator will use all of the evidence that they can get, including contacts with the client, 
reports by employers or schools etc., only requesting an independent specialist’s assessment 
in particularly difficult cases.   
- The ‘prolonged’ criterion further restricts CPP-D to those whose disabilities are likely to 
result in death, or are likely to be long continued (with no possibility of working within a 
year) and of indefinite duration (they have no fixed date when they could return-to-work). 
- The ‘severe’ criterion means that the disability “prevents him or her from regularly pursuing 
any substantially gainful occupation”.  This means the claimant’s disability stops them from 
performing all of the tasks required in a job, or from doing enough work in a given period of 
time to meet a typical job description.  It does this ‘regularly’ if the limitations are 
continuous, though episodic, cyclical and recurring medical conditions can all be considered 
continuous if they seem to continuously prevent people from working. 
Most crucially of all, ‘any occupation’ does not mean literally any occupation nationally, unlike in e.g. 
Australia.  Instead, it means “an occupation in which a person might reasonably be expected to be 
employed”, and explicitly takes into account three personal characteristics that ‘directly affect a 
person’s ability to work’: 
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 As in many other systems, certain medical conditions are assumed to meet the rest of the all criteria, e.g. 
AIDS, brain tumour, renal failure etc. 
 Age: "With increasing age there is a gradual reduction in the reserve capacity of most body 
organs. This can affect a person’s ability to recover from injury or illness and his or her ability 
to sustain work." 
 Education: "Generally speaking, the more education an individual has the more likely it is 
that the person will be able to do some form of work.” 
 Work experience: “Skills acquired in a previous job or jobs may enable a person to find other 
work that is suitable to the person’s limitations and restrictions.” 
Yet these personal characteristics are sharply distinguished from ‘socio-economic conditions’ such as 
local labour demand that are explicitly ignored, as confirmed in case law.  The federal agency further 
stresses people’s lack of work must be partly because of their disability, with the adjudicator having 
to look at a wide range of evidence to see if this is more likely than not (e.g. looking at their work 
history before and after the development of the disability).   
Lessons for the UK 
This is the clearest statement we have seen so far about how some real-world factors in incapacity 
can be included while others are excluded.  This comes despite the considerable flaws of the Canada 
system, which even the OECD sees as especially strict, and which leaves many people to try and 
privately self-insure against the risk of disability.  The example of Canada further shows that real-
world assessments are not necessarily generous, and more generally that the type of assessment is 
different from its generosity, as we also see when comparing the superficially similar systems in 
Sweden and Denmark. 
USA29 
Incapacity benefits 
For those who stereotype the US system as stigmatised, residualised welfare payments, the US 
incapacity system will come as something of a shock.  In fact, incapacity benefits fall on the other 
side of the ‘welfare’ vs. ‘social security’ divide that dominates US income transfers, and these social 
security payments are relatively generous, with a broad political constituency of support to defend 
them.  The two main federal Social Security Administration incapacity benefits are the more 
generous contributions-based Disability Insurance (DI), and for those that do not quality, the means-
tested Supplemental Security Income (SSI).  DI has a five-month waiting period that is meant to allow 
people to recover from short-term illnesses (as well as act as a disincentive for those who can work), 
but SSI is theoretically payable for the month following the application, much as there are delays in 
practice.   
Assessment of eligibility 
There is a single disability determination process for both DI and SSI, which is managed by the Social 
Security Administration and decided by Disability Determination Services (DDS) in a claimants’ home 
state.  It uses a definition of disability that (barring some amendments) dates back to 1974: 
Incapacity is “the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity (SGA) by 
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which can 
be expected to result in death, or which has lasted, or can be expected to last, for 
a continuous period of at least 12 months.” 
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As this makes clear, impairments must in the first instance be medically determinable – occupational 
therapists and other non-medical clinicians are only consulted after this criterion has been met.  
While DDS can recommend a further ‘consultative examination’ or speak to the claimant by phone, 
it must give priority to evidence from the claimants’ treating physician, although it can ask them for 
more detail.  This is one of several reasons why the system is beset with long delays.30  A public 
outcry of an attempted tightening of eligibility in the 1980s also means that DDS has to prove that 
that there has been a medical improvement prior to saying that someone is no longer entitled to 
benefits. 
Once impairment has been established, there are then two ways of being found eligible for DI/SSI.  
Firstly, the client’s impairments are compared to a ‘Listing of Impairments’, which details several 
hundred diagnoses and impairments considered severe enough that the DDS simply assumes they 
limit work activity.  Other impairments or combinations of impairments can also be considered 
equivalent to a listing if they produce the same symptoms as a listed impairment.  In the early years 
of the programme the Listings accounted for more than 90% of claims, but by the mid-2000s it had 
dropped to about half. 
Alternatively, a claimant’s actual work capacity is directly assessed.  This is done through a ‘Residual 
Functional Capacity assessment’ (RFC), which establishes functional capacity (in a way akin to the 
WCA), and then compares this to the claimant’s past relevant work, and then against any work in the 
national economy.  Mirroring the Canadian test, it assesses whether claimants “cannot, considering 
their age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work that 
exists in the national economy” – age, education and work experience being the same three factors 
singled out in Canada.  It also similarly separates these three characteristics from wider labour 
market factors, noting that their assessment ignores “whether such work exists in the immediate 
area in which they live, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for them, or whether they would be 
hired if they applied for work.” 
Lessons for the UK 
The American innovation is to use a structured tool to help assess real-world incapacity.  This was 
needed because the Social Security Administration had to prove that the claimant can engage in 
work available somewhere in the national economy, and they needed something that was defensible 
in court.  For many years they have used a large database of work requirements in different 
occupations – called the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), and created for entirely different 
purposes – to justify which occupations are available to people with which limitations; indeed, they 
even designed the SI/SSI criteria around it.  Yet the technical challenges in creating a valid database 
should not be underestimated.  DOT is now outdated, and its replacement is not suitable for 
disability assessment.  A dedicated panel spent five years (2008-2012) looking into this, and decided 
that a dedicated new Occupational Information Service database was needed, but Congress 
reportedly baulked at the price, and a less expensive version is currently being developed. 
The US case confirms what we learnt from Canada, and further shows that occupational databases 
can be used in real-world assessments – even if this is a technically complex and charged issue.   
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 In 2009, the DDS target for initial decisions was 3½ months, but many claimants go to appeal, and the target 
time for first-stage appeals was 1½ years.  One of the biggest problems is getting hold of medical records from 
private healthcare providers, which the DDS are compelled to use, but they say many healthcare providers 
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Netherlands31 
Incapacity benefits 
Among benefit experts, there are two things that the Netherlands is known for.  The first is the 
‘Dutch disease’, the high rate of incapacity claims that developed in the 1980s followed by a 
continuing series of reforms, anticipating the later rises and responses seen in most other high-
income countries.  The second is the heavy incentivising of employers to rehabilitate their employers 
– to the point that Dutch employers are responsible for the first two years of their employees’ 
sickness claims, unless they have a strong rehabilitation plan.  The benefits system that we describe 
therefore comes after this initial period of sickness, much later in people’s sickness/disability 
trajectories than the UK or most of the countries reviewed here.  But beyond this, our argument is 
that the Dutch system perhaps offers the most important lessons for a real-world rethinking of the 
WCA. 
From 2006, the Dutch system consists of three main benefits:32 
 WGA, a benefit for either partially disabled or temporarily disabled people, for a maximum 
of 38 months; 
 Follow-up benefit, a much less generous benefit after people’s eligibility for WGA has 
expired; 
 IVA, a relatively generous benefit with no time limits for people considered to be 
permanently fully-disabled, often for people who have already claimed WGA for some time.  
Assessment of eligibility 
One assessment seems to be carried out for all of these, which is delivered in two stages.  Firstly, a 
doctor employed by the social insurance agency completes a functional assessment of the claimant, 
covering 28 different types of task required in different occupations.  Some tasks here are similar to 
the WCA, but others cover more specialised functional capacities such as tolerance of vibration or 
reactions to heat.  The agency’s doctors can (with the claimant’s consent) ask for information from 
the treating doctor or claimant’s employer, and can hire a specialist; there has been an increasing 
emphasis on establishing that the limitations are caused by medical conditions rather than non-
medical factors.  Over a third of claimants are said to have such great impairments that they have 
‘no lasting capacities left’, and are awarded the benefit at this point. 
For others, the impact of these limitations on potential earnings is then assessed by a different 
person who is an expert in occupational health.  This expert has to find three types of job that the 
claimant could do, given their limitations, education, skills and work experience; if they cannot find 
three jobs that the claimant is considered fully disabled.  A further complexity within the Dutch 
system – not one that would necessarily work in the UK – is that it takes into account previous 
earnings, with a disabled person’s current earning capacity determined by earnings in the middle of 
the three best-paying occupations that they can do.   A person must have at least a 35% reduction in 
earnings capacity to be eligible for partial benefits, and nearly half of applicants now are found 
ineligible for disability benefits because their disability-related earnings reduction is below this 
threshold.   
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 There is also Wajong, a benefit for young people who have never worked.  While there has been increasing 
political attention to this, we ignore it here. 
Lessons for the UK 
Like the Americans, the Dutch have a large, dedicated database that helps the labour market expert 
match people’s functioning, education, skills and work experience with the requirements of different 
jobs.  This system is called CBBS (‘Claimbeoordelings- en Borgingssysteem’), and contains up-to-date 
information gained from on-site observations by labour experts.  At the present time it seems to 
contain 7,000 observations across 250 major occupations in the Netherlands; for each it lists 28 
functional capacity demands as well as the skills required to do the job, hours/working patterns etc.  
To reduce the costs of this exercise, they do not collect data on the other 1000 occupations that 
technically exist in the country, omitting rare occupations and focusing more on lower-skilled 
occupations that a greater proportion of people are qualified to do. 
As in nearly every country, the Netherlands explicitly says that local labour demand – the person’s 
actual ability to get these jobs – should not be taken into account; this is a deliberate change in 
practice in response to the so-called ‘Dutch disease’ of the 80s/90s.  But it is still a real-world 
assessment as it considers what jobs a person with particular skills, qualifications and impairments 
can actually do.  It has not been beyond criticism – in its early days it was found in court to be 
defensible but insufficiently transparent, verifiable and testable – but since then it seems to have 
faded into the background, a mark of success for an incapacity assessment.  While the Netherlands 
and the US share this idea of a database for real-world assessments, it is CBBS that seems to offer 
the more successful version at present. 
4. Rethinking the WCA in Britain 
In the real world, incapacity is about whether someone’s functional impairments interfere with their 
ability to get or keep a job, given who they are.  This definition of incapacity forces us to think both 
about what jobs normally involve; indeed, one of us has elsewhere found that declining workplace 
autonomy – which makes it harder to cope with impairments at work – partly explains rising 
incapacity in Britain (Baumberg, 2014a).  It also forces us to think about employers’ willingness to 
make exceptional changes for disabled people, particularly as the WCA currently finds people fit-for-
work on the assumption that employers will make significant adjustments (see Chapter 2).   
Our focus here, however, has been on how we assess real-world incapacity, based on our review of 
incapacity assessment in seven countries in the previous chapter.  In this concluding chapter, we 
draw together five lessons for a real-world rethinking of the WCA in Britain, followed by a suggested 
series of steps towards delivering it in practice.  We should stress that the nature of the assessment 
is separate to how many people are considered eligible for incapacity benefits, or how generous 
these benefits are – a generous or stringent system can exist within each principle of assessment, as 
the case studies show.   
Lessons from other countries 
Lesson #1: Real-world assessment is possible – and even commonplace 
In different ways, all of the countries in this review have a form of ‘real-world assessment’.  Often 
this begins with the same sort of functional assessment as the WCA – but then goes beyond this to 
look at whether people are actually incapacitated.  This is no surprise for the social democratic 
countries – we chose them for the review for this reason – but it is striking that even the other 
Anglo-Saxon welfare states have a greater consideration of real-world factors than the UK.  For 
example, Canada’s strict system explicitly says that age, education and work experience ‘directly 
affect a person’s ability to work’, and are therefore considered in their incapacity assessment.   
This is not to say that all follow an identical method; countries consider real-world factors in very 
different ways.  For example, the definitions of work capacity vary: some countries ask whether 
people are able to work part-time (New Zealand, Australia); other countries look at the percentage 
reduction in people’s earning capacity (Sweden, Netherlands); while Denmark considers whether a 
person would be able to get a subsidised ‘flex-job’.  Some of the assessments also explicitly take into 
account individual factors such as education or age (e.g. Canada, Netherlands, Sweden) which affect 
whether people’s real-world work capacity, while others do not.  But it is simply not the case that 
real-world assessments are utopian and unworkable; instead, it is the WCA that appears strange in 
an international perspective. 
Lesson #2: A standardised real-world assessment is possible 
One approach to real-world assessment is to introduce a discretionary system, as suggested for the 
UK by Professor Richard Berthoud (2011), and a little like the system used by some countries. For 
example, people’s own doctors in New Zealand are asked to decide whether the claimant is able to 
work 15 hours per week, without a structured process to help them determine this (and most of the 
countries here make more use of people’s treating doctor than the UK).  Even in the UK, the WCA 
has increasingly made use of discretionary  ‘special’ or ‘exceptional’ circumstances (see Chapter 2), 
and there is a move towards personalised employment support and conditionality that inevitably 
involves some element of discretion.  This does not necessarily mean assessments that are entirely 
outside of the control of policymakers; there are many ways of controlling discretion in 
bureaucracies, as we see in New Zealand, Sweden and Denmark. But many people seem to think 
that it is indefensible to have unstructured tests for benefit eligibility that work differently in 
different regions (see Chapter 2), and it is difficult to ensure consistency in any such discretionary 
system.  
However, it is also possible to marry standardisation with an accurate, real-world assessment.  The 
Netherlands and the USA both use databases of information on the various requirements of 
different occupations (both functional and educational), which are matched against the specific 
capacities and skills of the claimant to produce a list of occupations that the claimant can realistically 
do.  Such a system has two key advantages. Firstly, the claimant gets a clear message about why 
they are being found fit-for-work: it is because they are assessed as capable of doing particular 
occupations, and does not deny that they have genuine limitations that may limit their ability to do 
other occupations.  Secondly, this test has a much stronger link to employment support than the 
WCA.  By showing which jobs the claimant would be capable of, and in what circumstances, it 
provides the building blocks on which successful return-to-work strategies can be devised (indeed, 
some sort of vocational profiling and job matching is needed within many of the most successful 
strategies for helping disabled people return to work (Purvis et al., 2014)).    
Lesson #3: We can separate real-world incapacity from unemployment 
One of the challenges of real-world incapacity assessment is separating incapacity from 
unemployment.  As we said above, there is no getting around this problem: in the real world 
incapacity is intrinsically linked to employability, and attempts to avoid real-world factors such as the 
WCA are destined to fail to measure incapacity accurately.  In the face of this problem, there are two 
ways in which most other countries have nevertheless maintained a dividing line between 
unemployment and incapacity. 
Firstly, even if non-medical factors are taken into account in the assessment, many countries have 
emphasised that functional impairments still need to be caused by medical conditions – known in 
the Netherlands as ‘the causality principle’.  Canada even goes as far as reviewing a variety of 
evidence to check that non-employment is caused by medically-linked impairments rather than 
other factors.  A striking exception to this exists in Sweden, where people can be classified as having 
a ‘socio-medical disability’ for having a non-medical disadvantage in the labour market, such as being 
a migrant with poor Swedish language skills.  While we are definitely not recommending this for the 
UK, it makes some sense in the context of the Swedish system, where such groups can only be given 
suitable support if classified as disabled. 
Secondly, it is common to explicitly specify that local labour demand is not taken into account in the 
assessment.  This is crucial; as we saw above, a previous UK Minister has opposed a real-world 
assessment on the mistaken assumption that this inevitably means an inconsistent, ‘spatially-
specific’ assessment in different parts of the country.  This is not the case; the Canadian framework 
explicitly says that “we would not find one [claimant] disabled because unemployment is high while 
the other was not”, and the Australian, Dutch and American systems are similarly explicit.  These 
systems all consider real-world factors in the sense that they look at which jobs a person could 
realistically do, given their personal characteristics (including non-medical factors like age and 
qualifications) – but not whether are vacancies for these jobs at the present time.  This is often a 
deliberate change on what are perceived to be the flaws in past practice. 
Lesson #4: Unemployment benefits must also be a ‘safe place’ for disabled people 
Put simply, some genuinely disabled people will not be claiming incapacity benefits in almost any 
system.  As many as 11.5 million working-age people have a long-term condition, with 6.5 million 
counted as disabled under the Equality Act 2010 (Department for Work and Pensions, 2013), and 
many of these people – together with others with shorter-lasting impairments – will face genuine 
disadvantages in the labour market, even if their disabilities are not sufficient for them to be 
classified as entitled to incapacity benefits.  There is a compelling logic (discussed in Chapter 2) for 
the existence of incapacity benefits, and clearly those who are not realistically able to work should 
receive these benefits.  But despite this, the rest of the benefits system must still be a ‘safe place’ for 
other disabled people in the support that is given and (if this exists) in the conditionality that is 
applied. 
This is most critical in Australia and New Zealand, where nearly all disabled people are expected to 
claim the general unemployment benefit for the first two years of their impairment.  While our 
review did not focus on how conditionality was being applied in different countries, we do know that 
nearly half of Newstart Allowance claimants in Australia are exempt from conditionality at any one 
time, many of whom will be sick or disabled.  In these systems, long periods of failing to find work 
are part of the eligibility criteria for the more generous (and less conditional/unconditional) disability 
benefit, as they are when moving from sickness to long-term disability benefits in Denmark, Sweden 
and the Netherlands – something Deborah Mabbett terms a ‘procedural approach’ to incapacity 
assessment, and which does not seem to cause sickness claimants to turn down jobs in these 
systems.  It would seem reasonable to treat long periods of worklessness on unemployment benefits 
as evidence of incapacity among those with impairments, rather than continually and forlornly 
seeking to ‘activate’ them. 
In contrast, the British system deals badly with health problems among those claiming Jobseeker’s 
Allowance (JSA).  Jobcentre Plus advisers ‘have the flexibility to tailor conditionality’, according to 
the current Minister, but a senior DWP civil servant recently admitted that ‘not all Jobcentre advisers 
had been aware of this’ (Work and Pensions Committee, 2014). It is therefore unsurprising that 
charities and disability activists report examples of disabled people being (wrongly) told by 
Jobcentres that they could not claim JSA if they could not meet the conditionality requirements.  
This assumption that people found fit-for-work by the WCA have no health barriers is particularly 
extreme when we consider that a DWP-sponsored expert panel found that 83% of those found fit-
for-work would need “on average, two or three” workplace adjustments (see Chapter 2).  While 
there are promises that this will be improved under Universal Credit, JSA is not yet a safe place for 
disabled people, and this makes the WCA a higher-stakes and more traumatic assessment than it 
needs to be. 
Lesson #5: It is hard to evaluate the success of incapacity assessments from other countries 
We have talked about ‘the lessons from other countries’ – but we should stress that this is based on 
what other countries show to be possible, rather than proving empirically that their assessments are 
successful (whether we take success to mean accurate assessments, perceived legitimacy, or 
something else).  This is not because ‘success’ can be ignored, but because it is almost impossible to 
know how successful other countries’ incapacity assessments are.  It is extremely difficult to know 
even if a country’s system as a whole achieves good outcomes for disabled people; there are no 
trustworthy data on which countries are successful in getting disabled people into work and securing 
them against poverty (although the wider Rethinking Incapacity project is trying to estimate this).  
But even if these data did exist, then teasing out the role of the assessment itself would be almost 
impossible.  The OECD do present some statistics on the accuracy of incapacity assessments, but this 
is because of the pressures to produce some numbers, rather than because these numbers are 
credible.33 
To make matters even more difficult, to the extent that an incapacity assessment is working well, 
then it will not attract any attention, which makes it even harder to find any information about it.  
We therefore are left to assume that the Dutch system of structured incapacity assessment is more 
successful than the American system, on the grounds that there are fierce debates in the latter but 
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little comment in the former – but it is impossible to say whether this is due to the systems 
themselves, or because of the delays, almost non-existent unemployment benefits and litigious 
culture surrounding the US system.  It is also clear that the high levels of incapacity claims in nearly 
all of the countries here are a political issue, which reflects the wider structural issues that lead so 
many people to be excluded from the labour market in the early twenty-first century.  No country 
feels it has cracked the problem, and even if no other countries are currently subject to the outcry 
over the WCA, there is therefore a restless discontentment with many aspects of their incapacity 
system in most countries. 
Towards a new incapacity assessment 
These five lessons offer us a starting point for rethinking the WCA – yet further work is needed to 
turn these into a blueprint for implementation.  We therefore recommend that the new 
Government in May 2015 take the following steps towards a new incapacity assessment: 
 Commit to replacing the WCA with a real-world incapacity assessment.  Further research will 
be useful to understand the nature of real-world incapacity, and how disabled people’s 
wider circumstances make it easier or harder for them to work.  But even without this, we 
know that there is no meaningful definition of incapacity that is not based in the real-world.  
 Create a wide-ranging expert panel to develop the new incapacity test.  The US created an 
expert panel with expertise ranging from psychometrics to law, just to develop the database 
underpinning their system.  And while we have not dwelt on this here, ‘disability’ is a general 
term for a wide variety of different conditions and limitations, all of which need to be 
considered in detail for a new system.  The time and resources necessary to replace the WCA 
should not be underestimated. 
 Undertake study visits to key countries, particularly the USA and the Netherlands, to provide 
essential detail on how these systems work on the ground.  It will also guard against false 
idols – New Zealand introduced reforms based on a misunderstanding of the UK, and it does 
not seem sensible to mirror their misunderstandings in reverse.   
 Look at how the public and other key groups respond to any proposals.  As Dr Paul Litchfield 
has said, a guiding principle of reform must be that “any assessment should not only be fair 
but be perceived as such”.  Yet there is surprisingly little work on what the public take to be a 
‘fair’ incapacity system. 
 Estimate the costs of a new assessment system – but also the savings that it could generate.  
Introducing additional or longer assessments would have a cost, but we already collect much 
information on real-world incapacity to provide decent employment support (as Scope have 
noted34), and the costs of a fuller initial assessment would be counterbalanced by savings 
elsewhere.  We are also likely to achieve better employment outcomes from an improved 
assessment, not least because the widespread distrust of the WCA encourages people to 
‘hunker down’ on benefits rather than risk experimenting with work.35   
 Involve disabled people from the outset.  Any new system needs to be developed in 
collaboration with the many different groups that represent disabled people, ranging from 
established disability charities to grassroots movements – learning from the way that NDIS 
was developed in Australia (see footnote 24).   
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The next three years of the Rethinking Incapacity project (described on page 4) will contribute to 
some of these steps.  The project will investigate the role of non-medical factors in incapacity, both 
in Britain and across Europe.  It will explore public opinion on incapacity, using both a new survey 
and deliberative workshops with key groups.  And it will try and show which countries do better and 
worse in getting disabled people into work, overcoming the limitations that make existing data 
unreliable.  But academic research can only do so much in the absence of a wider appetite for 
change. 
There is wide agreement that we have pushed the WCA as far as we can in terms of minor tweaks 
and adjustments and changes of provider, and a major reform is now needed to restore the system 
to effectiveness and legitimacy.  Our view is that this reform should be based on a real-world idea of 
incapacity – not for political reasons, but simply because this is what incapacity is, what most people 
understand it to be, and what disabled people need to deal with in the real world.  This pamphlet 
has shown that real-world incapacity is a realistic path, and we hope that the sorely-needed review 
to overhaul the WCA will similarly begin in the real world of incapacity, rather than in the false 
dream of the WCA.  
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